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We investigate whether a bank’s performance during the 1998 crisis, which was viewed at the time
as the most dramatic crisis since the Great Depression, predicts its performance during the recent financial
crisis. One hypothesis is that a bank that has an especially poor experience in a crisis learns and adapts,
so that it performs better in the next crisis. Another hypothesis is that a bank’s poor experience in a
crisis is tied to aspects of its business model that are persistent, so that its past performance during
one crisis forecasts poor performance during another crisis. We show that banks that performed worse
during the 1998 crisis did so as well during the recent financial crisis. This effect is economically important.
In particular, it is economically as important as the leverage of banks before the start of the crisis.
The result cannot be attributed to banks having the same chief executive in both crises. Banks that
relied more on short-term funding, had more leverage, and grew more are more likely to be banks
that performed poorly in both crises.
Rüdiger Fahlenbrach
Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne (EPFL) 
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            “The worst financial crisis in the last fifty years” 
                    Robert Rubin 
   
 
1.  Introduction 
The crisis that Robert Rubin, then Secretary of the Treasury, called the worst in the last fifty years 
was the crisis of 1998. On August 17, 1998, Russia defaulted on its debt.  This event started a dramatic 
chain reaction.  As one observer puts it, “the entire global economic system as we know it almost went 
into meltdown, beginning with Russia's default.”
1   
As Russia defaulted, a number of investors made large losses.  This forced many of them to sell 
securities across many markets to raise cash.  Initially, the impact of the default was limited because there 
was hope that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) would step in and bail out Russia.  When it became 
clear that this would not happen, prices of emerging market securities fell sharply and stocks across the 
developed world soon followed suit.  As security prices fell, the capital of investors and financial firms 
was eroded.  Further, volatility increased.  These developments led investors and financial institutions to 
reduce their risk.  This caused a flight to safety, so that the prices of the safest and most liquid securities 
increased relative to the prices of other securities.  
An example of the impact of the crisis ignited by the Russian default that is often cited is the collapse 
of the hedge fund managed by Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM).  The fund‟s investors had made 
spectacular profits and the fund had almost never had a month with a negative return before the end of the 
spring of 1998.  During the month of August 1998, the fund lost 44% of its capital.  Eventually, in 
September,  the  Federal  Reserve  would  coordinate  a  private  bailout  of  this  fund,  which  required  an 
injection of $3.5 billion from more than 10 banks.  The head of the LTCM hedge fund described the 
events of the time as a ten-sigma event.
2  Other financial institutions also made massive losses.  For 
                                                 
1 See Friedman, Thomas L., The Lexus and the Olive Tree, 1999, p. 212. 
2 See Sloan, Allan, and Rich Thomas, “Riding For a Fall”, Newsweek, October 5, 1998, p. 56. 2 
 
example, the market capitalization of both CitiGroup and Chase Manhattan fell by approximately 50% in 
the two months following the Russian default.   
The impact of these events on securities with credit and liquidity risks was large.  Because of the 
flight to safety, U.S. Treasury securities increased in value, but the compensation that investors required 
to bear the risk of other securities increased sharply.  While interest rates were falling, riskier and less 
liquid securities saw their yields increase relative to the yields of Treasury bonds.  The president of the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York testified before Congress that “the abrupt and simultaneous widening 
of credit spreads globally, for both corporate and emerging-market sovereign debt, was an extraordinary 
event beyond the expectations of investors and financial intermediaries.”
3 The Federal Reserve decreased 
the Federal Funds target rate three times in the two months that followed the rescue of LTCM.    
The financial crisis that started in 2007 would eventually be described as the biggest financial crisis 
of the last 50 years, supplanting the crisis of 1998 for that designation. The comments we cite regarding 
the 1998 crisis are not different, however, from comments made in relation to the recent financial crisis. 
In particular, during the recent financial crisis investors made large losses in securities that had been 
designed to have a minimal amount of risk, and the unexpected losses in these securities led to fire sales, 
a withdrawal of liquidity from financial markets, and a flight to quality. The similarity between the crisis 
of 1998 and the recent financial crisis raises the question of how a bank‟s experience in one crisis is 
related to its experience in another crisis. There is increasing evidence in finance that past experiences of 
executives and investors affect their subsequent behavior and performance.
4 There is anecdotal evidence 
that the same is true for organizations. For instance, Lou Gerstner argues that the near-death experience of 
IBM in the early 1990s explains much of its subsequent success as it enabled him to “turn IBM into a 
market-driven  rather  than  an  internally  focused,  process-driven  enterprise.”  (Gerstner  (2002)).  If  an 
organization  and  its  executives  perform  poorly  in  a  crisis,  it  could  be  that  they  learn  to  do  things 
differently and consequently cope better with the next crisis. Further and perhaps more importantly, an 
                                                 
3 Testimony of William J. McDonough, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, before the U.S. House 
of Representatives Committee on Banking and Financial Services, “Risks of Hedge Fund Operations”, October 1, 
1998. 
4 See, e.g., Bertrand and Schoar (2003), Malmendier and Nagel (2010) and Malmendier, Tate, and Yan (2011).  3 
 
unexpected adverse event could lead an institution to assess payoff probabilities differently (for instance, 
as in Gennaioli, Shleifer, and Vishny (2011)) or reduce its risk appetite. Therefore, one hypothesis, the 
learning hypothesis, is that a bad experience in a crisis leads a bank to change its risk culture, to modify 
its business model, or to decrease its risk appetite so that it is less likely to face such an experience again. 
There is anecdotal evidence that executives claim they learned from the 1998 crisis. Lehman‟s CEO was 
the same in 1998 and 2006. He is quoted as having said in 2008 that “We learned a ton in „98”.
5  A recent 
book  on  AIG  describes  one  Goldman  Sachs  executive  as  having  “never  silenced  that  desire  to  do 
something about the next 1998, about never being dependent on short-term funding again.”
6 The book 
goes  on  describing  how  that  executive  obtained  authorization  in  2004  for  Goldman  to  lengthen  the 
maturity of its funding. Credit Suisse performed relatively well during the recent crisis and one senior 
executive told one of the authors that the explanation is that they learned a lot from their difficulties in 
1998.  
Another hypothesis, the business model hypothesis, is that the bank‟s susceptibility to crises is the 
result  of  its  business  model  and  that  it  does  not  change  its  business  model  as  a  result  of  a  crisis 
experience, either because it would not be profitable to do so or for other reasons. For instance, recent 
work by Adrian and Shin (2009) shows that broker-dealers increase their leverage in good times. Such an 
outcome may be the result of them having the best business opportunities during credit booms, but it also 
makes them more vulnerable if a credit boom is followed by a crisis. With this hypothesis, crisis exposure 
exhibits persistence, so that a bank‟s experience in one crisis is a good predictor of its experience in a 
subsequent crisis.  
We empirically test these two hypotheses against the null hypothesis that every crisis is unique, so 
that a bank‟s past crisis experience does not offer information about its experience in a future crisis. We 
find evidence that is strongly supportive of the business model hypothesis. We show that the stock market 
performance of banks in the recent crisis is positively correlated with the performance of banks in the 
                                                 
5 “At Lehman, allaying fears about being the next to fall,” by Jenny Anderson, New York Times, March 18, 2008. 
6 See Boyd (2011), p. 192.  4 
 
1998 crisis. This result holds whether we include investment banks in the sample or not. Our key result is 
that for each percentage point of loss in the value of its equity in 1998, a bank lost an annualized 66 basis 
points during the financial crisis from July 2007 to December 2008. This result is highly significant 
statistically. When we estimate a regression of the performance of banks during the financial crisis on 
their performance in 1998 as well as on characteristics of banks in 2006, we find that the return of banks 
in 1998 remains highly significant. For instance, the economic significance of the return of banks in 1998 
in explaining the return of banks during the financial crisis is of the same order of magnitude as the 
economic significance of a bank‟s leverage at the start of the crisis. Our results cannot be explained by 
differences in the exposure of banks to the stock market.  
From the perspective of bank performance, the crisis of 1998 and the financial crisis are the same in 
the sense that banks that had a near-death experience in 1998 had it again during the financial crisis – 
except  that  during  the  financial  crisis,  the  outcome  was  worse  for  the  banks  and  the  economy.  An 
important question is whether poor performance in one crisis makes it more likely that an institution will 
fail in the next crisis. We find that banks that performed poorly in 1998 were more likely to fail in the 
recent financial crisis. The effect of bank performance in 1998 on the probability of failure is extremely 
strong. A one standard deviation lower return during the 1998 crisis is associated with a statistically 
highly significant 5 percentage points higher probability of failure during the credit crisis of 2007/2008. 
Relative to the average probability of failure of 7.5% for the sample banks, this represents an increase of 
67% in failure probability. Again, this result holds whether we include or exclude investment banks in the 
sample.  
A natural question to ask is whether the correlation we document is affected by cases where the 
executive in charge during the financial crisis was also involved with the bank in 1998. It could be that 
personality traits of the executive rather than the bank‟s business model are responsible for the bank being 
positioned similarly for both crises. We investigate this possibility and find it does not explain our results. 
Another possible explanation for our results is that banks remember a different aspect of the 1998 crisis. 
Banks recovered rapidly from the 1998 crisis. Investors who took positions in more risky fixed-income 5 
 
securities at the bottom of the crisis made large profits. It is possible that banks that recovered strongly 
from  the  crisis  remembered  that  experience  subsequently  and  found  it  unnecessary  to  change  their 
business  model  as  a  result  of  their  strong  rebound.  We  do  not  find  evidence  supportive  of  this 
explanation.  
Our results hold when we control for characteristics that are commonly used as determinants of stock 
performance  of  financial  institutions.  However,  controlling  for  such  characteristics  may  lead  us  to 
understate the economic importance of the crisis persistence of banks in that these characteristics may 
result from the same unobserved characteristics of the business model that lead to poor performance 
during crises. We explore further whether the banks that perform poorly in the 1998 crisis as well as in 
the recent financial crisis have other common characteristics. We find that they do. We show that we can 
predict poor performers in  both  crises  using  some  bank  characteristics in  1997  as  well  as  the  same 
characteristics in 2006. In particular, the poor performers have greater reliance on short-term finance and 
grow more in the three years preceding the crisis. Whereas the existing literature has emphasized the role 
of  short-term  finance  in  making  financial  institutions  vulnerable  (e.g.  Adrian  and  Shin  (2010), 
Brunnermeier (2009), and Gorton (2010)), we are not aware of work that has shown that faster growing 
banks are more vulnerable to crises.  
Our paper is related to several recent papers on the financial crisis. Cheng, Hong, and Scheinkman 
(2010) examine whether excessive executive compensation, measured as size and industry-adjusted total 
compensation, is related to several risk measures of banks. They find evidence that excess compensation 
is correlated with risk taking and suggest that institutional investors both pushed managers towards a 
risky business model and rewarded them for it through higher compensation. Fahlenbrach and Stulz 
(2011) show that banks where the incentives of CEOs were better aligned with those of shareholders did 
not perform better during the crisis. Gandhi and Lustig (2010) show that a long-short portfolio where the 
largest banks are bought and the smallest are sold underperforms the market by approximately 8% from 
1970 to 2005. Ellul and Yerramilli (2010) find in a sample of 74 U.S. bank holding companies that those 
companies with strong and independent risk management functions tend to have lower enterprise-wide 6 
 
risk. Our paper is also related to the literature on measurement of the systemic risk exposure of individual 
banks. Acharya et al. (2010) propose a model-based measure of systemic risk that they call marginal 
expected shortfall. Their measure is the average return of a bank during the 5% worst days for the market 
in the year prior to the onset of the crisis. Our measure, the return during the crisis of 1998, which 
represents a true tail event, can also be interpreted as measuring systemic risk. De Jonghe (2010) uses 
extreme  value  theory  to  generate  a  market-based  measure  of  European  banks‟  exposure  to  risk  and 
examines how this measure correlates with interest income and components of non-interest income such 
as  commissions  and  trading  income.  Finally,  Adrian  and  Brunnermeier  (2010)  develop  a  model  to 
estimate the systemic risk contribution of financial institutions, ΔCoVaR. Their focus is on increasing 
comovement across institutions during financial crises. In contrast, we show comovement across financial 
crises at the financial institution level.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a brief overview of the events that 
hit financial markets in the summer and autumn of 1998. Section 3 describes our sample construction, 
offers summary statistics and contains the main empirical analysis. Section 4 discusses the results and 
Section 5 shows robustness tests. Section 6 concludes.  
 
2.  Timeline of events in 1998 
Russia had a large domestic currency debt as well as a large foreign currency sovereign debt. In 1998, 
it  was  facing  increasing  problems  in  refinancing  its  debt  as  well  as  in  raising  funds  to  operate  the 
government. However, financial markets generally believed that Russia was too big to fail and that the 
IMF  and  the  Western  countries  would  make  sure  that  it  would  not  default.  Many  hedge  funds  and 
proprietary trading desks had made large bets on the belief that Russia would not default, buying large 
amounts of its domestic debt and hedging it against currency risk. On August 13, 1998, the Russian stock 
and bond markets collapsed on fears of currency devaluation and dwindling cash reserves of the central 
bank.  Moody‟s  and  Standard  and  Poor‟s  downgraded  Russia‟s  long-term  debt  on  the  same  day.  On 
August 17, 1998 Russia defaulted on ruble-denominated debt, stopped pegging the Russian ruble to the 7 
 
dollar, and declared a moratorium on payments to foreign creditors. The currency collapsed as did the 
banking system. Investors reassessed the risk of sovereign countries. Levered investors who made large 
losses due to Russia‟s default were forced to sell securities. Banks that had large exposures to Russia and 
other troubled countries suffered losses. Sovereign spreads increased dramatically. Liquidity withdrew 
from securities markets.   
As liquidity withdrew, hedge funds focused on arbitrage in fixed-income markets made large losses. 
The  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  New  York  orchestrated  a  bailout  of  Long-Term  Capital  Management 
(LTCM), a Connecticut-based hedge fund founded by John W. Meriwether with approximately $5 billion 
in equity and $100 billion in assets in the beginning of 1998 (Loewenstein (2000)). LTCM‟s net asset 
value dropped by 44% during the month of August. By the end of August, its leverage had increased to 55 
to 1 (Loewenstein (2000)). A bankruptcy of LTCM was considered to be very costly for big U.S. banks, 
either directly through defaults on loans or indirectly because many of the highly levered derivatives 
positions  of  LTCM  had  banks  as  counterparties  and  any  fire  sales  of  collateral  would  likely  have 
destroyed substantial value because of the size of the positions of LTCM. During mid-September, after 
continued losses, Goldman Sachs, AIG, and Berkshire Hathaway started to work on a rescue package. 
This package was rejected on September 23, 1998, and on the same day, a rescue package orchestrated by 
the New York Fed was accepted. Eleven banks contributed $300 million, one contributed $125 million, 
and two contributed $100 million.  
The impact of these events on securities with credit and liquidity risks was extremely large.  Because 
of the flight to safety, U.S. Treasury securities increased in value, but the compensation that investors 
required to bear the risk of other securities increased sharply.  While interest rates were falling, riskier and 
less liquid securities saw their yields increase relative to the yields of Treasury bonds. By mid-October, 
the U.S. stock market had lost approximately 20% of its value, with equity volatility and credit spreads at 
historically high levels. The Federal Reserve responded by decreasing its target rate by three quarters of a 
percent in total within two months of the rescue of LTCM. 8 
 
We do not review the timeline of events for the financial crisis here because it is widely known (e.g., 
Brunnermeier (2009) or Gorton and Metrick (2010)). The events of 1998 parallel those of the financial 
crisis. During the financial crisis, investors made large losses in securities that had been engineered to 
have  a  minimal  amount  of  risk. The  unexpected losses  in these securities led  to fire sales and to a 
withdrawal of liquidity from financial markets.  
 
3.  Empirical analysis  
This section provides information on the construction of our sample, defines the principal variables 
we use in the statistical analysis, and shows our main results. 
 
3.1.  Sample construction 
The starting point for our sample are all companies with SIC codes between 6000 and 6300 that 
existed  in  July  1998  in  the  Center  for  Research  in  Security  Prices  (CRSP)  and  Standard  &  Poor‟s 
Compustat databases. We first exclude companies with foreign incorporation because our focus is on U.S. 
firms. We then reduce the sample to all those firms that also existed with the same Compustat identifier 
(gvkey) or permanent CRSP company identifier (permco) in Compustat and/or CRSP at the end of 2006. 
We automatically include firms in our sample that have the same gvkey, same permco, and the same or a 
very similar name in 1998 and 2006.
7 We manually examine firms that match on either the gvkey or 
permco criterion, but where names do not match. We include all firms where the identifiers are the same, 
but the name of the corporation changed (e.g., from PNC Bank Corporation (1998) to PNC Financial 
Services  Group  Inc.  (2006)  or  Countrywide  Credit  Industries  Inc.  (1998)  to  Countrywide  Financial 
Corporation (2006)).
8  
                                                 
7 We use the SAS command spedis to compare names and accept all banks as having similar names if the 
command returns a spelling distance smaller than 30.  
8 Some firms changed their names because of a new geographic orientation or a change in the business model, yet 
kept CRSP and Compustat identifiers. One may argue whether these are really the same firms in 1998 and 2006, but 
we decided to leave them in the sample to reduce as much as possible subjective classifications on our part. Note 
that including these firms will hurt our identification strategy.  9 
 
We allow firms to merge between 1998 and 2006. For most of our sample mergers and acquisitions, 
the new entity and the acquirer have the same name. In some mergers and acquisitions, the new entity‟s 
name is a mix of the names of the target and acquirer.  In several other cases, the acquiring company takes 
on the name of the target. In a few cases, the new entity has an entirely different name. As long as either 
Compustat‟s gvkey or CRSP‟s permco is the same in 1998 and 2006, we include the merger in our 
sample. Should our statistical analysis require data pre-merger, we always use, to be consistent, data from 
the entity that is defined in the CRSP database as the acquiring entity.
9  
In  the  last  step,  we  follow  Fahlenbrach  and  Stulz  (2011)  and  exclude  firms  that  are  not  in  the 
traditional banking industry, such as investment advisors (SIC 6282), online brokerages, or payment 
processors.  Our  final  sample  contains  347  firms  with  complete  return  data  for  1998  and  2006.  For 
increased transparency, we list sample firms in Appendix 1.  
We obtain stock returns from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), accounting data and 
information on investment securities, trading securities, assets held for sale, and deposits from Standard 
and Poor‟s Compustat, and Tier 1 capital ratios as well as net interest income and non-interest income 
from Compustat banking. We collect the names of the CEOs of sample firms from CompactDisclosure in 
1998 and the Corporate Library in 2006 as well as a manual search of proxy statements for firms not 
covered by these data sources. Thomson Reuters‟ SDC Platinum provides data on merger dates and 
transaction prices. We obtain information on notional amounts of derivatives from FR Y-9 statements for 
bank holding companies from the Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS) Bank Regulatory database. 
For the use of commercial paper, we combine information from Compustat and FR Y-9 statements. 
 
 
                                                 
9 Some of the biggest banks in the United States today were the result of mergers during our sample period (e.g., 
Traveler‟s Group acquired CitiCorp to form CitiGroup. Chase Manhattan Corp. acquired J.P. Morgan & Co to form 
JP Morgan Chase. NationsBank Corp acquired BankAmerica with the new entity operating under the name Bank of 
America. Norwest acquired Wells Fargo with the new entity operating under the name Wells Fargo). Because some 
readers may worry about whether the way we calculate 1998 crisis returns for these big mergers affects our results, 
we have verified that our main results hold if we exclude all banks which do not have the same name in 1998 and 
2006. This requirement reduces the sample to 288 firms. Our results remain qualitatively and quantitatively similar. 10 
 
3.2.  Main dependent and independent variables 
We investigate the determinants of returns of individual banks using buy-and-hold returns from July 
1, 2007, to December 31, 2008. Admittedly, the crisis did not end in December 2008. Bank stocks lost 
substantial ground in the first quarter of 2009. However, the losses in 2009 were at least partly affected by 
uncertainty about whether banks would be nationalized so that we stop calculating the buy-and-hold 
returns in December 2008.
10 Not all our sample banks survive until December 2008. If banks delist or 
merge prior to December 2008, we put proceeds in a cash account until December 2008.
11  
Some of our regressions use an indicator variable equal to one if a firm failed during the financial 
crisis as the dependent variable. Firms are considered to have failed if they are on the list of failed banks 
maintained by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), if they are not on the FDIC list but 
have filed for Chapter 11, if they merged at a discount, or if they were forced to delist by their stock 
exchange. We obtain information on the price per share paid as well as the announcement date for a 
merger  from  Thomson  Reuters‟  SDC  Platinum  database.  A  merger  is  judged  to  have  occurred  at  a 
discount if the price paid per share is lower than the target's stock price at market close one trading day 
before the announcement date. An example of a merger that occurred at a discount is the acquisition of 
Bear Stearns by JPMorgan Chase. Factiva news searches were performed to determine whether a delisting 
was voluntary or forced. We attempted to ensure that voluntary delisters did not delist to preempt an 
imminent  forced  delisting.  Most  voluntary  delisters  cited  reporting  obligations  and  other  regulatory 
compliance costs as the main reason for delisting. Among the banks that were forced to delist, two failed 
to meet the market capitalization requirements of the NYSE and Nasdaq, respectively;  one failed to 
submit an audited 2006 10-K by the final deadline set by the NYSE; and one saw its trading halted and 
was later delisted by NYSE Alternext after having failed to meet a deadline to raise capital or sell itself to 
an investor as required by the OTS in a cease-and-desist order. 
                                                 
10 However, we have also estimated regressions with buy-and-hold returns from July 2007 until December 2009. See 
Section 5 for results.  
11 We have verified that our results are qualitatively and quantitatively similar if proceeds are put in a bank industry 
index (using the Fama-French 49 “bank” industry). 11 
 
Our main explanatory variable is the return during the latter half of 1998. We construct the return 
during the crisis of 1998 as follows. We fix, admittedly somewhat arbitrarily, the start of the crisis to be 
August 3, 1998 (the first trading day of August 1998). We then search, for each sample firm, for the date 
between August 3 and December 31, 1998 on which the firm attains its lowest (split- and dividend-
adjusted) stock price. Finally, we use daily return data to calculate buy-and-hold returns from August 3, 
1998 to the low in 1998.  We also calculate a rebound buy-and-hold return, which is the six-month buy-
and-hold return following the lowest price of 1998.  
Figure 1 shows returns to an equal-weighted and value-weighted index of sample banks as well as the 
return to the value-weighted CRSP index between January 1998 and December 2009. Two things are 
noteworthy. First, large banks (the dashed line) emerged from the crisis in 1998 faster than small banks, 
but small banks (the solid line) tended to do better during much of 2000 – 2009.  Second, not only banks, 
but also the overall market (the dotted line) experienced severe losses during both the crisis of 1998 and 
the recent credit crisis. Because of the latter point, we include a bank‟s equity beta as a measure of 
systematic risk exposure in all of our regressions. We measure a bank's equity beta by estimating a market 
model of weekly bank returns in excess of 3-month T-bills from January 2004 to December 2006, where 
the market is represented by the value-weighted CRSP index. 
We follow Acharya et al. (2010) and approximate a bank‟s leverage as the quasi-market value of 
assets divided by the market value of equity. The quasi-market value of assets is defined as book value of 
assets  minus  book  value  of  equity  plus  the  market  value  of  equity.  All  other  control  variables  are 
described in the table captions.  
 
3.3.  Summary statistics 
Table 1 shows sample summary statistics. The median and mean annualized return for sample banks 
was  minus  30%  (minus  31%)  from  July  2007  to  December  2008.  Twenty-six  sample  banks  failed 
between July 2007 and December 2009, which corresponds to 7.49 percent of all sample observations. 
The median and mean return from August 3, 1998 to the lowest stock price in 1998 was approximately 12 
 
minus 24%, and minus 26%, respectively. Banks attained their lowest stock price on average 50 trading 
days after August 3, 1998 (early October 1998). Banks performed quite well during the  six months 
following their 1998 crisis, with median and mean rebound returns of 12% and 18%, respectively.  
For 43% of sample observations, we observe the same CEO in office in 1998 and 2006. The average 
bank has $40.4 billion in assets at the end of 2006, but the median bank has only $2 billion in assets. 
These numbers are substantially smaller than the mean ($129 billion) and median ($15.5 billion) total 
bank assets one would obtain from banks that are in the S&P 1500 (e.g., Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011)). 
The average bank in our sample has a book-to-market ratio of 0.6 and a market capitalization of $5.4 
billion. The average leverage is 7.6.  
Finally, the median and average equity beta of sample firms is equal to 0.77 and 0.70, respectively. 
Banks did well in 2006, with median and mean returns of 10% and 12%, respectively. The median and 
mean  Tier  1  capital  ratios  are  both  in  excess  of  10%,  so  that  they  are  well  above  the  statutory 
requirements.  The  minimum  Tier  1  capital  ratio  is  5.73%,  which  exceeds  the  minimum  capital 
requirement.  
 
3.4.  Do bank returns during the events of 1998 help predict bank returns during the financial 
crisis? 
We now test the three hypotheses we discussed in the introduction. The learning hypothesis implies 
that the crisis return of the recent crisis is negatively related to the crisis return of 1998, while the business 
model hypothesis implies a positive relation. The null hypothesis is that the returns during the two crises 
are unrelated. Table 2 shows strong support for the business model hypothesis. The crisis return of 1998 
has strong predictive power for the returns during the recent financial crisis. Banks that did poorly during 
the crisis of 1998 again did poorly during the recent financial crisis. The effect appears both economically 
and statistically significant. In the cross-section of banks, a one standard deviation higher return during 
the crisis of 1998 is associated with an 8.2% lower return (0.655 x 0.125) during the recent financial 
crisis. After controlling for the rebound return in 1998, the return during the calendar year 2006, the 13 
 
equity beta, the book-to-market ratio, the log of market value, and leverage (all measured at the end of 
fiscal year 2006), the effect is a 6.1% lower return during the recent crisis for a one standard deviation 
lower return during the events of 1998. Relative to the sample mean for the annualized crisis return 
2007/2008 of minus 31%, this corresponds to a drop of 20%. For comparison, a one standard deviation 
increase in leverage is associated with a 7.0% lower return (-0.0206 x 3.395) during the recent financial 
crisis. The effect is not driven by investment banks. In column 5, where we include regulatory capital and 
thus exclude non-depository institutions, we find economically and statistically similar results. We do not 
find support for the hypothesis that banks with stronger rebound returns remembered only that aspect of 
the  1998  crisis  subsequently  and  took  more  risks  as  a  result.  This  hypothesis  predicts  a  negative 
coefficient on rebound returns. Once we control for other return characteristics in columns 3 to 5, the 
coefficient on the six-month rebound return is indistinguishable from zero.  
Most of the control variables in column 4 have the expected sign, except for the coefficient on beta. 
Similar to Beltratti and Stulz (2011), we find that banks that did well in 2006 have poor crisis returns. 
Smaller banks did better during the recent crisis, as did banks with lower leverage (see, e.g., Acharya et 
al. (2010)). Surprisingly, the equity beta has a positive coefficient – banks with larger exposure to the 
market had better returns during the crisis.
12 Coefficients of control variables in column 5, based on a 
regression which excludes institutions that do not report Tier 1 capital, are qualitatively similar, but 
generally of lower significance. Banks with more Tier 1 capital did better during the financial crisis.  
Our  results  so  far  are  equally  consistent  with  banks  that  did  well  in  1998  again  doing  well  in 
2007/2008 and with banks doing poorly in 1998 again doing poorly in 2007/2008. In Table 3, we analyze 
whether there are asymmetries in the relation between crisis returns in 1998 and returns during the recent 
crisis. We split banks into quintiles based on their crisis returns of 1998 and create indicator variables for 
                                                 
12 This result is contrary to the findings reported in Acharya et al. (2010), who find a negative coefficient on beta in 
regressions of crisis returns on beta and controls. Two things help explain the difference in results. Acharya et al. 
(2010) measure beta over the period July 2006 to June 2007, while we measure beta over 2004-2006. When we 
estimate beta over the same time period as Acharya et al. (2010), we find that beta is indistinguishable from zero. 
Acharya et al. (2010) also have a smaller sample as they require financial institutions to have a market capitalization 
of at least $5 billion. When we restrict our sample to the 100 largest banks in our sample, and measure beta from 
July 2006 to June 2007, we find a statistically significantly negative coefficient on beta of -0.25 (compared to -0.29 
in Acharya et al. (2010)).  14 
 
each of the five groups. Quintile 1 contains all observations whose return during the crisis of 1998 is 
among the 20% lowest. For consistency, we proceed similarly with the rebound returns in 1998. Table 3 
reports results of regressions in which we replace the 1998 crisis and rebound returns with the quintile 
indicator variables. The omitted group is quintile 5, the quintile of banks that did best during the crisis 
and rebound period, respectively. Table 3 shows that banks that performed extremely poorly during the 
crisis of 1998 did so again during 2007/2008. We report in column 1, which does not include other 
control variables, that being in the bottom quintile in 1998 is associated with an almost 23% lower return 
during the financial crisis of 2007/2008. Only the coefficient on the lowest 1998 crisis quintile indicator 
variable is statistically significant, and it is much larger than the other coefficients.
13  
Controlling for leverage, beta, size, and returns in 2006 attenuates the effect to a certain extent. 
However, in column 2, which includes the same control variables as the regressions reported in Table 2, 
the coefficient on the bottom 1998 crisis quintile indicator is still an economically significant -17% and is 
also statistically significant at the one percent level. Column 3 of Table 3 shows that the effect is not 
driven by investment banks. Requiring institutions to report Tier 1 capital (and thus excluding investment 
banks) leads to a statistically and economically significant minus 15.6% lower crisis return if the 1998 
return fell into the lowest quintile. Columns 4 and 5 of Table 3 show that controlling for the 1998 rebound 
return quintiles does not change the results for the 1998 crisis quintile indicator variables. Returns during 
the recent financial crisis are 16.9% lower if the firm is in the bottom quintile of 1998 returns (sample of 
all  banks,  column  4).  None  of  the  quintile  indicator  variables  for  rebound  returns  is  statistically 
significant. Results for the sample that excludes non-depository institutions yield a similar picture for the 
bottom quintile crisis returns.  
Commentators have argued during the recent financial crisis that some banks may have known that 
they were too big to fail, and that this might have created incentives to take on more risks than socially 
optimal. Similarly, if banks knew that they were too big to fail, they may have felt less compelled to 
                                                 
13 Wald tests reject the hypothesis of joint equality of 1998 crisis return quintile coefficients for all specifications 
that contain banks and investment banks.  15 
 
change their business model after the 1998 crisis, because they were reasonably certain to receive federal 
assistance during the next crisis. Alternatively, it may be harder to change the business model of a large 
bank. In Table 4, we split the sample of banks into two groups, based on the median value of total assets 
in 2006, and repeat the regressions of Table 2, columns 3 and 4. We find that the predictive power of 
1998 crisis returns is concentrated in large banks. Columns 1 and 2 show that there is no predictive power 
of 1998 crisis returns in the sample of small banks. Columns 3 and 4 repeat the regressions for the sample 
of large banks only. A one standard deviation higher 1998 crisis return for large banks is associated with 
about 11% higher annualized crisis returns in 2007/2008.
14  However, in regressions not reported in Table 
4, we analyze whether the effect is concentrated in the largest banks (those with assets in excess of $50 
billion) and find that there is no difference in the coefficient of 1998 crisis returns for these and all other 
banks. Columns 5 through 7 report regressions that use the entire sample, and include interaction terms of 
the crisis return 1998 and rebound return 1998 with an indicator variable equal to one if the bank is of 
above median size. The results in columns 5 and 6 are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to those 
reported in columns 1 through 4. Column 7 reports results that focus on depository institutions only, and 
shows  that  our  results  are  not  driven  by  investment  banks.  The  crisis  returns  of  1998  have  strong 
predictive power for crisis returns during the financial crisis for large banks that report Tier 1 capital.  
Table 5 examines whether the predictive power of 1998 crisis returns is different for banks which had 
the same CEO in 1998 and 2006. A different correlation could arise for at least two different reasons. 
First, a bank CEO whose strategy led to large realized tail risk in 1998 (and who survived in his job) may 
have gotten more cautious and may have reduced, relative to other banks, the risk exposure of his bank 
during the build-up of the recent financial crisis. This hypothesis would predict a statistically significant 
negative coefficient on an interaction term of the 1998 crisis return with a same CEO indicator variable. 
On the other hand, a CEO may have certain personality traits and attitudes towards risk that are time-
invariant. In that case, and to the extent that banks do not always hire CEOs with similar traits, it could be 
                                                 
14 One may be concerned that small banks‟ business model is more local so that they would not have had any direct 
exposure to the kind of assets that were affected in the 1998 financial crisis, which originated in Russia. However, it 
turns out that the average 1998 crisis return among large banks is -25.8%, compared to -26.0% for small banks. 
Hence, on average, large and small banks seem to have been affected equally by the financial crisis of 1998.  16 
 
that the executive‟s ideas on how to run a bank rather than the bank‟s business model itself explain our 
results.  If  that  were  the  case,  we  would  expect  a  statistically  significant  positive  coefficient  on  the 
interaction term. Table 5 shows the results. The interaction variable same CEO x crisis return 1998 is not 
statistically significantly different from zero in any specification. We cannot reject the hypothesis that the 
predictive power of 1998 returns is the same in banks with and without the same CEO in 1998 and 2006.  
 
3.5.  Do bank returns during the events of 1998 help predict failure during the financial crisis?  
The analysis so far has focused on stock returns. An important question to address is whether poor 
performance in a crisis makes it more likely that the bank itself will be unable to survive a subsequent 
crisis. If banks that perform poorly in a crisis have inherently more exposure to systemic risk, these banks 
are more likely to fail during the next crisis. Table 6 shows the status of sample banks by the end of 
2009.
15 We classify 321 banks or 92.5% of our sample banks as having survived the crisis. Of those, 280 
were listed on a major U.S. stock exchange at the end of 2009.  Thirty-four banks merged during the 
period July 2007 to December 2009 at a premium. We define a merger to have happened at a premium if 
the price per share paid during the transaction is higher than the closing price per share on the last day 
prior  to  the  merger  announcement.  Seven  sample  banks  voluntarily  delisted  to  avoid  regulatory 
compliance costs. We observe 26 bank failures, which we define as banks being closed by the FDIC or 
OTS (15 observations), banks merging at a discount (5 observations), forced delistings by an exchange (4 
observations), or chapter 11 filings (2 observations).
16 Classifying bank mergers at a discount as failures 
captures the cases of Bear Stearns (discount of 67%) and Countrywide Financial (discount of 8%), among 
others.  
Table 7 shows the results of probit regressions of bank failures on the same explanatory variables we 
used before. All specifications report marginal effects. Poor crisis returns in 1998 are associated with a 
                                                 
15 We chose to extend the time period for failures to the end of 2009, because banks may be closed by the FDIC or 
OTS with a delay. Of the 26 banks we classify as failures, 11 failed during 2009.  
16 For some failures, such a classification is not clear-cut. For example, Washington Mutual Bank was seized by the 
Office of Thrift Supervision, and its bank holding company, Washington Mutual, Inc., filed for chapter 11. In Table 
6, we classify the Washington Mutual failure as “Closed by FDIC/OTS”, because the seizure preceded the Chapter 
11 filing by one day.  17 
 
significantly higher probability of failure during the recent credit crisis. The effects are economically 
large. In the most comprehensive specification in column 4, a one standard deviation lower return during 
the 1998 crisis is associated with a statistically significant 5.0% (-0.3994 x 0.125) higher probability of 
failure during the credit crisis of 2007/2008. Relative to the average probability of failure for our sample 
of 7.5%, this corresponds to an economically highly significant increase in the probability of failure of 
67%. Regarding the control variables, it appears that larger banks were more likely to fail.  Somewhat 
surprisingly, neither leverage nor beta has explanatory power in the probit regressions.  
Perhaps not surprisingly, non-depository institutions had higher failure rates (4/18=22%). However, 
column  5,  which  excludes  non-depository  institutions,  shows  that  the  results  are  quantitatively  and 
qualitatively similar for regressions using the sample of depository institutions.  
Overall, the results of the probit regressions are consistent with the return results of Tables 2 through 
5.  We  show  in Tables  2 to  5  that  poor  returns  during  the  1998  crisis  had  predictive  power for  the 
2007/2008 crisis return, and Table 7 corroborates this finding by showing that poor returns in 1998 
predict bank failure during the recent crisis. It is important to note that this result is consistent with banks 
maximizing  shareholder  wealth  in  choosing  their  business  model  and  their  risk  appetite,  in  that  the 
expected  gains  from  positioning  themselves  as  they  did  may  have  exceeded  the  expected  costs  for 
shareholders from the resulting increase in the probability of failure.  
 
4.  Discussion and interpretation 
We have shown strong evidence in support of the business model hypothesis in Section 3. To make 
some progress towards an explanation of our key finding, we now examine the characteristics of sample 
banks that were in the bottom tercile of performance in both 1998 and 2007/2008. There were 51 such 
banks. We focus on three main areas. We measure the degree to which banks relied on leverage, and in 
particular short-term funding. We examine market leverage, defined as before, as well as whether the 
bank had an S&P rating and the ordinal measure of the institution‟s rating. We define short-term funding 
as debt with maturity of less than one year, divided by total liabilities (i.e., the sum of short-term debt, 18 
 
long-term  debt,  deposits,  and  other  liabilities  (Compustat  acronym  LT)).  The  data  source  for  these 
measures is Compustat. We also analyze an indicator variable equal to one if the firm uses commercial 
paper, and zero otherwise. These data come from Compustat and FR Y-9, the consolidated financial 
statements for bank holding companies. The second area we focus on is the rate at which banks grew their 
balance sheets prior to the two crises. We measure asset growth as the annualized growth rate of total 
assets during the three years preceding the 1998 crisis and the three years preceding the recent financial 
crisis,  respectively.  Finally,  we  examine  the  degree  to  which  banks  derived  their income  from  non-
traditional banking business. We focus on the fraction of income that is non-interest income as well as the 
fraction of total assets that consists of investment securities, assets held for sale, and trading securities, 
respectively. In addition, we analyze the total notional amount of derivatives outstanding. This analysis is 
in the spirit of De Jonghe (2010) who examines, for a sample of European banks, how a measure of 
systemic risk correlates with interest income and components of non-interest income such as commissions 
and trading income. 
Table 8 shows summary statistics of key variables for bottom tercile performers at the end of fiscal 
year 2006 and at the end of fiscal year 1997, the last fiscal year ends available prior to the respective 
crisis. Panels A and B show results for all banks, while panels C and D show results for depository 
institutions only. 
It  is  striking  that  bottom  performers  in  both  crises  grew  substantially  faster  than  other  financial 
institutions during the three years before the start of the crisis. Before the most recent crisis, bottom 
performers grew more than the other financial institutions by 70%.  During the three years prior to the  
1998 crisis, they grew more than the other financial institutions by 45%. Adding the 2004-2006 asset 
growth rate to the regressions of Table 2, the coefficients on the 1998 return are still significant, but their 
economic magnitude and statistical significance falls by 25 percent.  
Bottom performers had an approximately 30% higher leverage than other institutions prior to both 
crises, with the differences being strongly statistically significant. Bottom performers relied, relative to all 
other institutions, much more heavily on commercial paper and other short-term funding prior to the 19 
 
crises of 1998 and 2007/2008. On average, 18% (27%) of liabilities were financed short-term in 2006 
(1997) for bottom performers, relative to 8.5% (9%) in other financial institutions. These differences are 
again highly statistically significant. In addition, bottom performers relied statistically significantly less 
on financing through customer deposits,
17 which account for an average of 65% (59%) of their liabilities 
in 2006 (1997), as compared to 79% (84%) for other financial institutions. This evidence demonstrates 
that the funding fragility that Gorton (2010) finds to have played a critical role in the propagation of the 
recent crisis and that Beltratti and Stulz (2011) show to be negatively associated with bank performance 
during the recent crisis was also an important determinant of the performance of financial institutions in 
the 1998 crisis. However, this difference in liability structure does not appear to explain our main result. 
In particular, if we add 2006 short-term funding to the principal regressions of Table 2, the coefficients of 
the 1998 return are unaffected. Relatively more of the poorly performing institutions are rated, but given 
there is a rating, the ordinal measure of the ratings is not different across poorly performing and other 
institutions.  
Overall, there seems to be a clear difference in the liability structure of the firms that performed 
poorly  prior  to  both  crises.  This  difference in  liability  structure is  not  driven  by  the  non-depository 
institutions, as panels C and D of Table 8, which focus on depository institutions only, show.  
We also examine differences in investment and trading positions and assets held for sale. Poorly 
performing institutions held fewer investment securities prior to both crises. There is some evidence that 
they also had larger trading positions and more assets held for sale, but these effects are economically 
small. Panels C and D also examine, for depository institutions, differences in non-interest income and 
the size of the derivatives positions. Bottom performers relied significantly less on non-interest income in 
2006,  but  we  find  no  difference  in  1997.  There  are  no  differences  in  the  total  notional  amount  of 
derivatives positions.
18  
                                                 
17 These include deposits by individuals, partnerships, and corporations. 
18 Note, however, that we do not know whether these derivatives are used for hedging or speculation. Hence, while 
the notional amounts are quite similar, the use of these derivatives and its consequences for the income statement 
could be very different (for more discussion, see Gorton and Rosen (1995)). 20 
 
Many of the variables we analyze in Table 8 are correlated, and we do not control for important bank 
characteristics such as bank size. To better assess how bank characteristics are correlated with banks‟ 
crisis performance, we report in Table 9 probit regressions explaining whether a financial institution is in 
the bottom performer group during both crises. Panel A uses 2006 firm characteristics as independent 
variables, while Panel B uses 1997 firm characteristics.  It might seem odd to use bank characteristics in 
2006 to help understand whether a bank performed poorly in the 1998 crisis as well as in the more recent 
crisis. However, the purpose of the experiment is to assess how bank characteristics are related to crisis 
performance. The idea in using the 2006 characteristics is to assess whether bank characteristics at a point 
in time are useful in predicting how a bank will fare in a crisis. According to model (1) in Panel A, poor 
performance is correlated with short-term funding independent of leverage. At the sample mean, a one 
standard  deviation  change  in  short-term  funding  is  associated  with  a  6.7%  (0.6214  x  0.108)  larger 
probability of being in the bottom performer group. This is large relative to an unconditional probability 
of 14.7% of being in that group. Further, model (1) shows an extremely strong effect of asset growth. A 
one standard deviation increase in asset growth is associated with a 7.8% (0.7835 x 0.099) increase in the 
probability of being a bottom performer. Model (2) shows that deposits, which are highly negatively 
correlated with short-term funding, are associated with a lower probability of membership in the bottom 
performer  group,  but  this  result  is  statistically  weaker.
19  Leverage  is  significantly  positive  in  all 
regressions, and the return in 2006 is significantly positive in model (1). Model (3) adds the amount of 
investment securities, trading securities, and assets held for sale on the balance sheet as explanatory 
variables.  The  amount  of  investment  securities  held  is  significantly  negatively  associated  with  the 
probability of being a bottom performer, with a 7.5% (-0.6184 x 0.121) decrease in probability for a one 
standard deviation change in investment securities. Trading securities and assets held for sale are not 
significant. Model (4) examines non-interest income. Interestingly, banks with a higher fraction of non-
interest  income  are  less  likely  to  become  members  of  the  bottom  performer  group.  A  one  standard 
deviation increase in the percentage of non-interest income is associated with a 5.1% (-0.3801 x 0.133) 
                                                 
19 The correlation between deposits and short-term funding is -75.6% in 2006 and -84.7% in 1997. 21 
 
smaller probability of being a bottom performer. Models (5) and (6) focus on commercial banks and add 
the use of derivatives and commercial paper. Coefficients on these two variables are not statistically 
significantly different from zero. 
Panel B examines whether the same characteristics measured in 1997 can help explain bank‟s bottom 
performer  status.  Because  of  data  availability,  the  number  of  observations  in  each  regression  is 
substantially reduced, and income variability and the rating variable are omitted entirely. The results for 
1997 firm characteristics in Panel B are weaker but generally consistent with the results using 2006 
characteristics.  
The above results suggest that the correlation between returns during the 1998 financial crisis and the 
recent financial crisis is at least partly due to a business model that relies on higher leverage, more short-
term funding, and stronger asset growth during the boom preceding a crisis. If this is the case, we should 
expect to find that returns during the 1998 crisis predict the levels of these firm characteristics in 2006, 
the year prior to the recent crisis. In Table 10, we analyze the predictive power of 1998 crisis returns for 
leverage, the Tier 1 capital ratio, short-term funding, and asset growth prior to the recent crisis. We also 
add the distance to default. Following Laeven and Levine (2009), we measure the distance to default as 
the natural logarithm of (ROA+CAR)/volatility(ROA), where ROA is the return on assets and CAR is the 
capital to assets ratio. We measure the volatility of ROA on a quarterly basis from 2003 through 2006.  
Table 10 shows that banks that did poorly in 1998 have significantly higher leverage in 2006. A one 
standard deviation change in the 1998 crisis return results in a 0.47 (-3.7974 x 0.125) unit change in 
leverage, or 6.2% relative to the mean. This result is essentially the same whether or not non-depository 
institutions are included. Interestingly, banks that rebounded more strongly after the 1998 crisis also 
appear to have higher leverage in 2006. Tier 1 capital and distance to default can only be measured for 
depository institutions. Banks that did poorly in 1998 have less Tier 1 capital and a shorter distance to 
default in 2006, although the latter result is not statistically significant. Model (5) shows that banks that 
rebounded strongly in 1998 use more short-term funding in 2006, but this result is entirely driven by non-
depository  institutions.  When  we  focus  on  depository  institutions  (model  (6)),  it  is  again  the  poor 22 
 
performers of 1998 who used more short-term funding. Models (7) and (8) also show that banks that 
performed poorly in 1998 grew their assets more strongly during 2004 through 2006.
20 In model (7), a one 
standard deviation worse 1998 crisis return is associated with a 1.9 percentage points (0.1505 x 0.125) 
higher asset growth, or 17.3% relative to the mean. In sum, the results of Table 10 are consistent with the 
interpretation that the 1998 crisis return captures aspects of a bank‟s business model. 
 
5.  Robustness  
Our main sample consists of only 347 observations. Hence, there is the danger of outliers driving 
some of our results. We have estimated several additional regressions to test the robustness of the main 
results in Tables 2 and 4.  We have estimated median regressions, in which the sum of the absolute value 
of residuals rather than the sum of the squared residuals is minimized and thus the problem of outliers is 
reduced. Our results are robust to this additional specification. Table 11, columns 1 and 2, reports the 
results  from  median  regressions  using  the  main  specification  from  Table  2.  The  coefficients  of  the 
principal variable of interest, the crisis return of 1998 remains economically strongly significant, although 
the statistical significance is reduced to the twelve percent level for all banks and the five percent level for 
the sample without investment banks. The results are also robust if we use either truncated or winsorized 
returns for the financial crisis and/or explanatory variables to reduce the danger of outliers driving results.   
We have also estimated regressions in which we changed the time period over which we measure 
returns during the recent financial crisis. When we define crisis returns during the recent crisis as returns 
from July 2007 to December 2009, the predictive power of 1998 returns continues to be statistically 
significant, but loses approximately one third of its economic significance.  
Our principal tests calculate buy-and-hold returns during the crisis of 1998 from August 3, 1998 to 
the day each bank attains the lowest stock price. Hence, banks‟ buy-and-hold returns are not calculated 
over the same time horizon. To alleviate concerns about this issue, we have re-estimated regressions in 
                                                 
20 Since asset growth is measured during 2004 through 2006, the control variables for the asset growth regressions 
are measured at the end of 2003. For the other regressions, control variables are measured at the end of 2005. 23 
 
which we define crisis returns during the crisis of 1998 as starting for all banks in August 1998 and 
ending either at the beginning of October 1998 or at the beginning of November 1998. Table 11, columns 
3 and 4 show that the redefined 1998 crisis returns using a common cutoff for all banks of October 1, 
1998 continue to have economically and statistically significant explanatory power for returns during the 
recent financial crisis. Results using the November 1, 1998 cutoff lose about 25% of their economic 
significance relative to the results reported in Table 11, but continue to be statistically significant. They 
are omitted for brevity. 
We have attempted to ensure that changing the way we control for systematic risk exposure does not 
affect our results. We have estimated beta over different time periods, using either weekly or daily data. 
In addition, we have calculated the marginal expected shortfall variable of Acharya et al. (2010) and have 
included it in the place of beta as a control variable in the regressions. Our main results are robust to these 
alternative specifications.  
Finally, one might be concerned that our use of raw returns to calculate buy-and-hold crisis returns is 
problematic. We have re-estimated the main regressions of Table 2 using market-model adjusted buy-and-
hold  returns  for  our  main  dependent  and  independent  variable.  We  calculate  monthly  market-model 
adjusted crisis returns as the difference between banks‟ crisis returns and banks‟ beta times the value-
weighted CRSP return, where returns are measured in excess of the 3-month T-bill rate. Beta is estimated 
from 1995-1997 for the 1998 crisis returns and from 2004-2006 (or June 2006-June 2007) for financial 
crisis returns. For the 228 banks that have data going back to 1995, results using raw returns and excess 
returns are qualitatively and quantitatively similar. 
Our second set of robustness tests deals with a different issue. In the interpretation of our results, we 
ascribe a special importance to the performance of banks during the events of 1998 and its ability to 
predict returns during the recent financial crisis.  What if our proxies for systematic risk such as beta are 
mismeasured and any past return  has predictive power for the performance during the recent crisis? 
Alternatively, what if the crisis return of 1998 also predicts returns during a calm period for banks? If any 
one of these two points is true, our interpretation of the crisis return 1998 might be questioned. We 24 
 
attempt to address these concerns in Table 12. In columns 1 and 2, we reproduce our principal regressions 
of Tables 2 and 4 for comparison. In columns 3 and 4, we estimate the same regressions, but replace the 
crisis return 1998 with a “placebo crisis” return for 1997. We calculate the “placebo crisis” return with 
buy-and-hold returns from August 1, 1997 until 50 trading days later. We use fifty trading days because 
this is the average holding period from the first trading day in 1998 until the worst day of 1998. Columns 
3 and 4 of Table 12 clearly show that the placebo crisis return 1997 does not have predictive power for 
the recent financial crisis. In columns 5 and 6 of Table 12 we replace the left-hand-side financial crisis 
return of 2007/2008 with a “placebo crisis return” by calculating annualized buy-and-hold returns for 
sample banks from July 2005 until December 2006. The results of columns 5 and 6 of Table 12 show that 
the crisis return of 1998 does not have predictive power for returns from July 2005 to December 2006. It 
follows from this experiment that the features of the business model that help predict crisis performance 
are not helpful to predict performance outside of crises. In unreported regressions, we predict 2005/2006 
returns using returns of 1997, i.e. using two periods of good bank performance. We do not find evidence 
that a period of good performance predicts another period of good performance. 
 
6.  Conclusion  
We find that the stock market performance of banks during the 1998 financial crisis predicts their stock 
market performance during the financial crisis of 2007/2008. Our key result is that for each percentage 
point of loss in the value of its equity in 1998, a bank lost an annualized 66 basis points during the recent 
financial crisis. This result holds whether we include investment banks in the sample or not. Our result 
cannot be explained by differences in the exposure of banks to the stock market or the same executives 
running the banks in 1998 and 2007.  Our result is consistent with what we call the business model 
hypothesis and inconsistent with the learning hypothesis. Banks that are negatively affected in a crisis do 
not appear to subsequently alter the business model or to become more cautious regarding their risk 
culture. Consequently, the performance in one crisis has strong predictive power for a crisis which starts 
almost a decade later.  25 
 
An important caveat applies to the interpretation of our results, however. By their very nature, crises 
are unexpected. We cannot exclude that banks learned from 1998 and chose to take less risk on the asset 
side, but as they invested in less risky assets, those assets turned out to perform unexpectedly poorly in 
the recent crisis. There is no good way to assess comprehensively the ex ante risk of the assets banks 
invest in, so that there is no good way to exclude the possibility that banks that suffered more from 1998 
chose to invest more safely. However, our evidence shows that the banks that performed poorly in both 
crises had more risky funding, higher leverage, and greater growth than other banks before the crises. 
Hence,  our  evidence  does  suggest  that  banks  did  not  change  fundamental  aspects  of  their  business 
strategy as a result of their performance in the 1998 crisis.   
Given our main result, some of the events subsequent to 1998 that have been argued to have played a 
key  role  in  the  performance  of  banks  during  the  financial  crisis  have  to  be put  in  perspective.  The 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley  Act  (GLBA)  was  signed  into  law  in  November  1999.  GLBA  repealed  central 
provisions  of  the  Glass-Steagall  Act  that  restricted  bank  holding  companies  from  affiliating  with 
securities firms and insurance companies. Leading economists have suggested that the recent financial 
crisis can be, in part, blamed on GLBA.
21 The strong return predictability of 1998 crisis returns for the 
financial crisis of 2007/2008 shows that part of the performance of banks during the recent crisis can be 
attributed to factors that already existed before the enactment of GLBA or other regulatory decisions such 
as the Commodities Futures Modernization Act or the SEC‟s amendments to the broker-dealer net capital 
rule.  
Though we provide evidence that the banks that perform poorly in both crises are more reliant on 
short-term market funding than other banks and grow more in the three years before the crisis, we do not 
find that reliance on short-term market funding and greater asset growth are sufficient to explain our 
result that returns during the recent crisis are predictable from returns of the 1998 crisis. Consequently, 
                                                 
21 For example, Paul Krugman has argued that: “[…] aside from Alan Greenspan, nobody did as much as Mr. 
Gramm to make this crisis possible” (New York Times, Taming the beast, March 24, 2008). Joseph Stiglitz is 
quoted in an article on how GLBA helped to create the current economic crisis as saying: “As a result, the culture of 
investment banks was conveyed to commercial banks and everyone got involved in the high-risk gambling 
mentality. That mentality was core to the problem that we're facing now” (ABC news, Who‟s whining now? Gramm 
slammed by economists, Marcus Baram, Sep 19, 2008). 26 
 
further research should attempt to isolate aspects of a firm‟s business model or culture that can explain 
this predictability. Cheng, Hong, and Scheinkman (2010) show that compensation practices in the late 
1990s help explain the performance of banks during the recent crisis. Compensation practices can also be 
a manifestation of the deeper fundamentals that lead to persistence in crisis exposure.  
In the absence of quantifiable information about a bank‟s business model or culture that could be used 
to measure its sensitivity to crises, our evidence shows that there is strong persistence in crisis exposure 
for crises that are ten years apart so that a bank‟s performance in one crisis is an important measure of its 
inherent riskiness and exposure to crises.   
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Appendix 1  
The appendix lists all sample firms. Shown is the name as it appears in the field “comnam” of the 
Compustat database at the end of fiscal year 2006. 
  
1ST SOURCE CORP 
ABIGAIL ADAMS NATL BANCORP 
INC 
ALABAMA NATIONAL BANCORP 
DEL 





AMERISERV FINANCIAL INC 
AMERITRANS CAPITAL CORP 
ANCHOR BANCORP WISCONSIN 
INC 
ANNAPOLIS BANCORP INC 
ARROW FINANCIAL CORP 
ASTORIA FINANCIAL CORP 
AUBURN NATIONAL BANCORP 
B B & T CORP 
B C S B BANKCORP INC 
B O K FINANCIAL CORP 
BANCFIRST CORP 
BANCORP RHODE ISLAND INC 
BANCORPSOUTH INC 
BANCTRUST FINANCIAL GROUP 
INC 
BANK GRANITE CORP 
BANK NEW YORK INC 
BANK OF AMERICA CORP 
BANK OF HAWAII CORP 
BANK OF THE OZARKS INC 
BANK SOUTH CAROLINA CORP 
BANKATLANTIC BANCORP INC 
BANKUNITED FINANCIAL CORP 
BANNER CORP 
BAR HARBOR BANKSHARES 
BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC 
BEVERLY HILLS BANCORP INC 
BLUE RIVER BANCSHARES INC 
BNCCORP 
BOE FINANCIAL SVCS OF VA INC 
BOSTON PRIVATE FINL HLDS INC 
BRITTON & KOONTZ CAPITAL 
CORP 
BROADWAY FINANCIAL CORP 
DEL 
BROOKLINE BANCORP INC 
BRYN MAWR BANK CORP 
C & F FINANCIAL CORP 
C C F HOLDING COMPANY 
C F S BANCORP INC 
C V B FINANCIAL CORP 
CAMCO FINANCIAL CORP 
CAMDEN NATIONAL CORP 
CAPITAL BANK CORP NEW 
CAPITAL CITY BANK GROUP 
CAPITAL CORP OF THE WEST 
CAPITOL BANCORP LTD 
CARDINAL FINANCIAL CORP 
CARROLLTON BANCORP 
CARVER BANCORP INC 
CASCADE BANCORP 
CASCADE FINANCIAL CORP 
CATHAY GENERAL BANCORP 
CENTER BANCORP INC 
CENTRAL BANCORP INC 
CENTRAL PACIFIC FINANCIAL 
CORP 
CENTRAL VIRGINIA BANKSHARES 
INC 
CENTRUE FINANCIAL CORP NEW 
CENTURY BANCORP INC 
CHARTERMAC 
CHEMICAL FINANCIAL CORP 
CHITTENDEN CORP 
CITIGROUP INC 
CITIZENS BANKING CORP MI 
CITIZENS SOUTH BANKING CORP 
DEL 
CITY HOLDING CO 
CITY NATIONAL CORP 
COBIZ INC 
CODORUS VALLEY BANCORP INC 
COLONIAL BANCGROUP INC 
COLONY BANKCORP INC 
COLUMBIA BANKING SYSTEM INC 
COMERICA INC 
COMM BANCORP INC 
COMMERCE BANCORP INC NJ 
COMMERCE BANCSHARES INC 
COMMERCIAL NATIONAL FINL 
CORP 
COMMUNITY BANK SHRS 
INDIANA INC 
COMMUNITY BANK SYSTEM INC 
COMMUNITY BANKS INC PA 
COMMUNITY BANKSHARES INC S 
C 
COMMUNITY CAPITAL CORP 
COMMUNITY FINANCIAL CORP 
COMMUNITY TRUST BANCORP 
INC 
COMMUNITY WEST BANCSHARES 
COMPASS BANCSHARES INC 
COOPERATIVE BANCSHARES INC 
CORUS BANKSHARES INC 
COUNTRYWIDE FINANCIAL CORP 
COWLITZ BANCORPORATION 
CULLEN FROST BANKERS INC 
DEARBORN BANCORP INC 
DIME COMMUNITY BANCSHARES 
DORAL FINANCIAL CORP 
DOWNEY FINANCIAL CORP 
E S B FINANCIAL CORP 
EASTERN VIRGINIA BANKSHARES 
INC 
ELMIRA SAVINGS BANK FSB NY 
F F D FINANCIAL CORP 
F M S FINANCIAL CORP 
F N B CORP PA 
F N B CORP VA 
F N B FINANCIAL SERVICES CORP 
F N B UNITED CORP 
FARMERS CAPITAL BANK CORP 
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL MORT 
CORP 
FEDERAL HOME LOAN 
MORTGAGE CORP 
FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE 
ASSN 
FEDERAL TRUST CORP 
FIDELITY BANCORP INC 
FIDELITY SOUTHERN CORP NEW 
FIFTH THIRD BANCORP 
FIRST ALBANY COS INC 
FIRST BANCORP NC 
FIRST BANCORP P R 
FIRST BANCSHARES INC MO 
FIRST CHARTER CORP 




FIRST DEFIANCE FINANCIAL CORP 
FIRST FEDERAL BANCSHARES 
ARK INC 
FIRST FEDERAL BANKSHARES INC 
DEL 
FIRST FINANCIAL BANCORP OHIO 
FIRST FINANCIAL BANKSHARES 
INC 
FIRST FINANCIAL CORP IN 
FIRST FINANCIAL HOLDINGS INC 
FIRST FINANCIAL SERVICE CORP 
FIRST HORIZON NATIONAL CORP 
FIRST INDIANA CORP 
FIRST KEYSTONE FINANCIAL INC 
FIRST LONG ISLAND CORP 
FIRST M & F CORP 
FIRST MARINER BANCORP 
FIRST MERCHANTS CORP 
FIRST MIDWEST BANCORP DE 
FIRST MUTUAL BANCSHARES INC 
FIRST NIAGARA FINL GROUP INC 
NEW 
FIRST REGIONAL BANCORP 
FIRST REPUBLIC BANK S F 
FIRST SOUTH BANCORP INC 
FIRST STATE BANCORPORATION 
FIRST UNITED CORP 
FIRST WEST VIRGINIA BANCORP 
INC 
FIRSTFED FINANCIAL CORP 
FIRSTMERIT CORP 
FLAGSTAR BANCORP INC 
FLUSHING FINANCIAL CORP 
FREMONT GENERAL CORP 
FRONTIER FINANCIAL CORP 
FULTON FINANCIAL CORP PA 
G S FINANCIAL CORP 
GERMAN AMERICAN BANCORP 
INC 
GLACIER BANCORP INC NEW 
GREAT PEE DEE BANCORP 
GREAT SOUTHERN BANCORP INC 
GREATER BAY BANCORP 
GREATER COMMUNITY BANCORP 
GUARANTY FEDERAL 
BANCSHARES INC 
H F FINANCIAL CORP 
H M N FINANCIAL INC 
HABERSHAM BANCORP INC 
HANCOCK HOLDING CO 
HARLEYSVILLE NATIONAL CORP 
PA 
HARLEYSVILLE SAVINGS FINAN 
CORP 
HERITAGE COMMERCE CORP 30 
 
HERITAGE FINANCIAL CORP WA 
HINGHAM INSTITUTION FOR SVGS 
MA 
HOME FEDERAL BANCORP 
HOPFED BANCORP INC 
HORIZON FINANCIAL CORP WASH 
HUNTINGTON BANCSHARES INC 




INDEPENDENT BANK CORP MA 
INDEPENDENT BANK CORP MICH 
INDYMAC BANCORP INC 
INTEGRA BANK CORP 
INTERNATIONAL BANCSHARES 
CORP 
INTERVEST BANCSHARES CORP 
IRWIN FINANCIAL CORP 
JACKSONVILLE BANCORP INC 
JEFFERIES GROUP INC NEW 
JEFFERSONVILLE BANCORP 
JPMORGAN CHASE & CO 
KEYCORP NEW 
L S B BANCSHARES N C 
L S B CORP 
L S B FINANCIAL CORP 
LAKELAND FINANCIAL CORP 
LANDMARK BANCORP INC 
LEESPORT FINANCIAL CORP 
LEHMAN BROTHERS HOLDINGS 
INC 
M & T BANK CORP 
M A F BANCORP INC 
M B FINANCIAL INC NEW 
M F B CORP 
MAINSOURCE FINANCIAL GROUP 
INC 
MARSHALL & ILSLEY CORP 
MASSBANK CORP 
MAYFLOWER CO OPERATIVE BK 
MA 
MEDALLION FINANCIAL CORP 
MERCHANTS BANCSHARES INC 
MERRILL LYNCH & CO INC 
META FINANCIAL GROUP INC 
MID PENN BANCORP INC 
MIDSOUTH BANCORP INC 
MIDWEST BANC HOLDINGS INC 
MIDWESTONE FINANCIAL GROUP 
INC 
MORGAN STANLEY DEAN WITTER 
& CO 
MUNICIPAL MORTGAGE & EQUITY 
LLC 
N B T BANCORP INC 
NARA BANCORP INC 
NATIONAL CITY CORP 
NATIONAL PENN BANCSHARES 
INC 
NEW HAMPSHIRE THRIFT 
BNCSHRS INC 
NEW YORK COMMUNITY 
BANCORP INC 
NORTH CENTRAL BANCSHARES 
INC 
NORTH VALLEY BANCORP 
NORTHEAST BANCORP 
NORTHERN STATES FINANCIAL 
CORP 
NORTHERN TRUST CORP 
NORTHRIM BANCORP INC 
NORTHWAY FINANCIAL INC 
NORTHWEST BANCORP INC PA 
NORWOOD FINANCIAL CORP 
OAK HILL FINANCIAL INC 
OCEANFIRST FINANCIAL CORP 
OCWEN FINANCIAL CORP 
OHIO VALLEY BANC CORP 
OLD NATIONAL BANCORP 
OLD SECOND BANCORP INC 
OMEGA FINANCIAL CORP 
OPPENHEIMER HOLDINGS INC 
ORIENTAL FINANCIAL GROUP INC 
P A B BANKSHARES INC 
P F F BANCORP INC 
P N C FINANCIAL SERVICES GRP 
INC 
P V F CAPITAL CORP 
PACIFIC CAPITAL BANCORP NEW 
PACIFIC PREMIER BANCORP INC 
PAMRAPO BANCORP INC 
PARK BANCORP INC 
PARK NATIONAL CORP 
PARKVALE FINANCIAL CORP 
PATHFINDER BANCORP INC 





PEOPLES BANCORP INC 
PEOPLES BANCORP NC INC 
PEOPLES BANCTRUST CO INC 
PEOPLES BANK BRIDGEPORT 




PREMIER FINANCIAL BANCORP 
INC 
PRINCETON NATIONAL BANCORP 
INC 





PULASKI FINANCIAL CORP 
Q C R HOLDINGS INC 
REGIONS FINANCIAL CORP NEW 
RENASANT CORP 
REPUBLIC BANCORP INC KY 
REPUBLIC FIRST BANCORP INC 
RIVER VALLEY BANCORP 
RIVERVIEW BANCORP INC 
ROYAL BANCSHARES PA INC 
S & T BANCORP INC 
S C B T FINANCIAL CORP 
S L M CORP 
S V B FINANCIAL GROUP 
S Y BANCORP INC 
SANDY SPRING BANCORP INC 
SAVANNAH BANCORP INC 
SEACOAST BANKING CORP FLA 
SECURITY BANK CORP 
SHORE FINANCIAL CORP 
SIMMONS 1ST NATIONAL CORP 
SLADES FERRY BANCORP 
SOUTH FINL GROUP INC 
SOUTHSIDE BANCSHARES INC 
SOUTHWEST BANCORP INC OKLA 
SOUTHWEST GEORGIA FINANCIAL 
CORP 
SOVEREIGN BANCORP INC 
STATE BANCORP INC NY 
STERLING BANCORP 
STERLING BANCSHARES INC 
STERLING FINANCIAL CORP 
STERLING FINANCIAL CORP 
WASH 
STUDENT LOAN CORP 
SUFFOLK BANCORP 
SUN BANCORP INC 
SUNTRUST BANKS INC 
SUSQUEHANNA BANCSHARES INC 
PA 
SUSSEX BANCORP 
SYNOVUS FINANCIAL CORP 
T C F FINANCIAL CORP 
T F FINANCIAL CORP 
T I B FINANCIAL CORP 
TECHE HOLDING CO 
TIMBERLAND BANCORP INC 
TOMPKINS TRUSTCO INC 
TRICO BANCSHARES 
TRUSTCO BANK CORP NY 
TRUSTMARK CORP 
U M B FINANCIAL CORP 
U S B HOLDING CO INC 
U S BANCORP DEL 
UMPQUA HOLDINGS CORP 
UNION BANKSHARES CORP 
UNIONBANCAL CORP 
UNITED BANCORP INC 
UNITED BANKSHARES INC 
UNITED COMMUNITY FINL CORP 
OHIO 
UNITY BANCORP INC 
UNIVERSITY BANCORP INC 
VALLEY NATIONAL BANCORP 
VIRGINIA COMMERCE BANCORP 
W HOLDING CO INC 
WACHOVIA CORP 2ND NEW 




WASHINGTON FEDERAL INC 
WASHINGTON MUTUAL INC 
WASHINGTON SAVINGS BANK FSB 
WASHINGTON TRUST BANCORP 
INC 
WAYNE SAVINGS BANCSHARES 
INC NEW 
WEBSTER FINL CORP 
WATERBURY CONN 
WELLS FARGO & CO NEW 
WESBANCO INC 
WEST COAST BANCORP ORE NEW 
WESTAMERICA 
BANCORPORATION 
WHITNEY HOLDING CORP 
WILMINGTON TRUST CORP 
WINTRUST FINANCIAL 
CORPORATION 
WORLD ACCEPTANCE CORP 
WSFS FINANCIAL CORP 
WVS FINANCIAL CORP 








Figure 1: Equally-weighted and value-weighted indices of bank returns 
 
The figure plots the value of two stock price indices constructed for sample banks from January 
1998 through December 2009 as well as a value-weighted market index. “EW Sample Index” 
represents an equal-weighted index and “VW Sample Index” is the value-weighted index of the 
bank stocks in the sample. Both indices are rebalanced monthly. The sample consists of 347 
banks that were in existence under the same or similar name in July 1998 and July 2007. Before 
and after these dates, the indices consist of fewer banks due to IPOs (before July 1998) and 
delistings (after July 2007). In January 1998, there are 309 bank stocks and in December 2009, 
there are 281 bank stocks remaining in the sample. “VW CRSP Index” is the index constructed 
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Table 1: Sample summary statistics 
The table presents summary statistics for the sample of 347 banks. “Financial crisis return” is the annualized stock return from July 2007 through December 2008. If a 
bank was delisted during the period from July 2007 to December 2008, the return (including delisting return) until the last day of listing was used, and proceeds were 
put into a cash index until December 2008. “Bank failed” is an indicator variable equal to one if the bank was closed by the FDIC/OTS, merged at a discount relative 
to the last close prior to the merger announcement, or was forced to delist by an exchange during the period from July 2007 to December 2009. “Crisis return 1998” is 
the bank's stock return from August 3, 1998 (the first trading day in August 1998) until the day in 1998 on which the bank's stock attains its lowest price. If the lowest 
price occurs more than once, the return is calculated using the first date on which it occurs. “Days in crisis 1998” reports the number of trading days from August 1, 
1998 to the date of the lowest price. “Rebound return 1998” is the stock return over the six months following the date on which the lowest price first occurs. “Placebo 
return 1997” measures a hypothetical crisis return from August 1, 1997 (the first trading day in August 1997) over the following 50 trading days, i.e. the average of the 
“days in crisis 1998” variable. “Return 2005 – 2006” is the annualized stock return from July 2005 through December 2006. “Same CEO in 1998” is an indicator 
variable equal to one if the CEO at the end of fiscal year 2006 was already in office on August 1, 1998, and zero otherwise. Accounting data are measured at the end of 
fiscal year 2006 and include the book-to-market ratio (book value of common equity divided by market value of common equity), leverage (book value of assets minus 
book value of equity plus market value of equity, divided by market value of equity), the natural log of the market value of the bank's equity, and the Tier 1 capital 
ratio as reported in the Compustat Bank database. Other firm characteristics are the bank‟s stock return during calendar year 2006 and the bank's equity beta (obtained 
from a market model of weekly returns in excess of 3-month T-bills from January 2004 to December 2006, where the market is represented by the value-weighted 
CRSP index). 
 
  Number  Min  Lower 
Quartile 
Median  Upper 
Quartile 
Max  Mean  Standard 
deviation 
Financial crisis return  347  -1.00  -0.54  -0.30  -0.05  0.47  -0.31  0.33 
Bank failed  347  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00  0.07  0.26 
Crisis return 1998  347  -0.97  -0.32  -0.24  -0.18  0.00  -0.26  0.12 
Days in crisis 1998  347  0.00  44.00  47.00  53.00  105.00  50.39  23.90 
Rebound return 1998  346  -0.21  0.04  0.12  0.24  1.84  0.18  0.26 
Placebo return 1997  304  -0.19  0.07  0.13  0.21  0.80  0.15  0.12 
Return 2005 – 2006  347  -0.68  0.01  0.08  0.17  0.77  0.10  0.15 
Same CEO in 1998  347  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00  1.00  0.43  0.50 
Beta  347  -0.52  0.22  0.77  1.13  1.83  0.70  0.51 
Return in 2006  347  -0.73  0.01  0.10  0.20  0.82  0.12  0.18 
Total assets  347  56.02  794.54  2047.54  7371.13  1884318.00  40385.84  184549.47 
Total liabilities  347  34.26  727.17  1813.96  6083.51  1764535.00  37474.62  172172.47 
Book-to-market  346  0.19  0.45  0.57  0.73  1.35  0.60  0.19 
Market capitalization  347  8.84  105.45  366.52  1258.24  273598.06  5439.75  24565.06 
Leverage  346  1.28  5.61  6.71  8.71  38.20  7.57  3.39 
Tier 1 capital ratio  319  5.73  8.93  10.53  12.23  21.94  10.86  2.65 
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Table 2: Buy-and-hold returns during the financial crisis and returns during the crisis of 1998 
The table shows results from cross-sectional regressions of annualized buy-and-hold returns for banks from July 
2007 to December 2008 on the banks' performance during the crisis of 1998 and firm characteristics. If a bank was 
delisted during the period from July 2007 to December 2008, the return (including delisting return) until the last day 
of listing was used, and proceeds were put into a cash index until December 2008. “Crisis return 1998” is the bank's 
stock return from the first trading date in August 1998 until the day in 1998 on which the bank's stock attains its 
lowest price. “Rebound return 1998” is the stock return over the six months after the date on which the lowest price 
occurs. Control  variables include  the bank's equity beta  measured during 2004  – 2006 and the stock return in 
calendar year 2006. The additional control variables are measured at the end of fiscal year 2006 and include the 
book-to-market ratio, the natural log of the market value of the bank's equity, leverage, and the Tier 1 capital ratio. 




  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 










           










           










           










           










           










           










           










           










Number of observations  347  346  346  345  318 
R-squared  0.06  0.02  0.06  0.16  0.13 
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Table 3: Buy-and-hold returns during the financial crisis and returns during the crisis of 1998 – 
Return quintiles 
The  table  shows  cross-sectional  regressions  of  annualized  buy-and-hold  returns  for  banks  from  July  2007  to 
December 2008 on the banks' performance during the crisis of 1998 and firm characteristics. If a bank was delisted 
during the period from July 2007 to December 2008, the return (including delisting return) until the last day of 
listing  was  used,  and  proceeds  were  put  into  a  cash  index  until  December  2008.  Banks  are  sorted  into  return 
quintiles based on the crisis return 1998. “Crisis return 1998” is a bank's stock return from the first trading date in 
August 1998 until the day in 1998 on which the bank's stock attains its lowest price. “Crisis return 1998 Q1/Q2...” 
denotes banks whose stock returns during the crisis of 1998 were in the lowest/second lowest return quintile for that 
period, and so forth. “Rebound return 1998” is the stock return over the six months after the date on which the 
lowest  price  occurs.  “Rebound  return  1998  Q1/Q2...”  indicates  that  the  bank's  return  reversal  was  within  the 
lowest/second lowest quintile, and so forth. Control variables include the bank's equity beta measured during 2004 – 
2006 and the stock return in calendar year 2006. The additional control variables are measured at the end of fiscal 
year 2006 and include the book-to-market ratio, the natural log of the market value of the bank's equity, leverage, 
and  the  Tier  1  capital  ratio.  Numbers  in  parentheses  are  t-statistics,  and  ***,  **,  and  *  indicate  statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 










           










           










           










           










           










           










           










           










           










           










           










           










           










           










Number of observations  347  346  319  346  319 
R-squared  0.06  0.17  0.14  0.17  0.14 
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Table 4: Differences between small banks and large banks 
The  table  shows  cross-sectional  regressions  of  annualized  buy-and-hold  returns  for  banks  from  July  2007  to 
December 2008 on the banks' performance during the crisis of 1998 and firm characteristics If a bank was delisted 
during the period from July 2007 to December 2008, the return (including delisting return) until the last day of 
listing was used, and proceeds were put into a cash index until December 2008. The sample is split into small bank 
and large bank subsamples based on whether the bank's book value of assets at the end of fiscal year 2006 is below 
or above the sample median. “Crisis return 1998” is the bank's stock return from the first trading day in August 1998 
until the day in 1998 on which the bank's stock attains its lowest price. “Rebound return 1998” is the stock return 
over the six months after the date on which the lowest price occurs. Control variables include the bank's equity beta 
measured during 2004 – 2006 and the stock return in calendar year 2006. The additional control variables are 
measured at the end of fiscal year 2006 and include the book-to-market ratio, the natural log of the market value of 
the bank's equity, leverage, and the Tier 1 capital ratio. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics, and ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
  Small banks  Large banks  Full sample 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 














               
Crisis return 1998 















               














               
Rebound return 1998  















               














               














               














               














               














               














               














               














Number of observations  173  173  173  172  346  345  318 
R-squared  0.01  0.07  0.13  0.31  0.08  0.19  0.16 
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Table 5: CEOs and financial crisis returns 
The  table  shows  cross-sectional  regressions  of  annualized  buy-and-hold  returns  for  banks  from  July  2007  to 
December 2008 on the banks' performance during the crisis of 1998 and firm characteristics. If a bank was delisted 
during the period from July 2007 to December 2008, the return (including delisting return) until the last day of 
listing was used, and proceeds were put into a cash index until December 2008. “Crisis return 1998” is the bank's 
stock return from the first trading date of August 1998 until the day in 1998 on which the bank's stock attains its 
lowest price. “Rebound return 1998” is the stock return over the six months after the date on which the lowest price 
occurs. “Same CEO in 1998” is an indicator variable equal to one if the bank's CEO at the end of 2006 held the 
position of CEO in 1998, and zero otherwise. Control variables include the bank's equity beta measured during 2004 
– 2006 and the stock return in calendar year 2006. The additional control variables are measured at the end of fiscal 
year 2006 and include the book-to-market ratio, the natural log of the market value of the bank's equity, leverage, 
and  the  Tier  1  capital  ratio.  Numbers  in  parentheses  are  t-statistics,  and  ***,  **,  and  *  indicate  statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 










           










           
Crisis return 1998  











           
Rebound return 1998  











           










           










           










           










           










           










           










           










Number of observations  346  346  345  319  318 
R-squared  0.07  0.17  0.17  0.15  0.14 
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Table 6: Bank failures from July 2007 through December 2009 
The table gives an overview of how many of the sample banks delisted and how many of them failed during the 
period from July 2007 through December 2009. Banks are considered to have survived if they are still listed at the 
end of 2009, if they merged at a premium during the period from July 2007 through December 2009, or if they 
delisted voluntarily. Banks are considered to have failed if they are on the list of failed banks maintained by the 
FDIC, if they are not on the FDIC list but have filed for Chapter 11, if they merged at a discount or if they were 
forced to delist by their stock exchange. A merger is judged to have occurred at a premium if the price per share paid 
is higher than the target's stock price at market close one trading day before the announcement date. Factiva news 
searches were performed to determine whether a delisting was voluntary or forced. Most voluntary delisters cited 
reporting obligations and other regulatory compliance cost as the main reason for delisting. Among the banks that 
were  forced  to  delist,  two  failed  to  meet  the  market  capitalization  requirements  of  the  NYSE  and  Nasdaq, 
respectively; one failed to submit an audited 2006 10-K by the final deadline set by the NYSE; and one saw its 
trading halted and was later delisted by NYSE Alternext after having failed to meet a deadline to raise capital or sell 




  Number  Percent 
Bank survived     
Listed at end of 2009  280  80.69 
Merged at premium  34  9.80 
Voluntary delisting  7  2.02 
Total survivors  321  92.51 
     
Bank failed     
Closed by FDIC/OTS  15  4.32 
Merged at discount  5  1.44 
Forced delisting by exchange  4  1.15 
Chapter 11  2  0.58 
Total failures  26  7.49 
Total  347  100.00 
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Table 7: Bank failure during the financial crisis and performance during the 1998 crisis  
The table presents marginal effects from probit regressions predicting bank failure during the period from July 2007 
through December 2009. “Crisis return 1998” is the bank's stock return from the first trading day of August 1998 
until the day in 1998 on which the bank's stock attains its lowest price. “Rebound return 1998” is the stock return 
over the six months after the date on which the lowest price occurs. Control variables include the bank's equity beta 
measured during 2004 – 2006 and the stock return in calendar year 2006. The additional control variables are 
measured at the end of fiscal year 2006 and include the book-to-market ratio, the natural log of the market value of 
the bank's equity, leverage, and the Tier 1 capital ratio. Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics, and ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 










           










           










           










           










           










           










           










Number of observations  347  346  346  345  318 
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Table 8: Comparison of firm characteristics – bottom performers vs. other institutions 
The table presents summary statistics comparing the characteristics of financial institutions whose stock return was 
in the bottom tercile for both the 1998 crisis and the financial crisis of 2007/2008 with financial institutions whose 
stock  return  was  above  the  bottom  tercile  for  at  least  one  of  these  periods.  Panel  A  (Panel  B)  examines 
characteristics  measured at the end of 2006 (at  the end of 1997) for all financial institutions. Panels C and D 
examine  depository  institutions  only.  The  variables  “return  in  2006”,  “book-to-market”,  “log  (market  value)”, 
“beta”, “leverage”, and “Tier 1 capital ratio” are defined in Table 1. “Asset growth” is the annualized growth rate of 
total assets from fiscal year end 2003-2006. “Short-term funding” is calculated as debt in current liabilities divided 
by total liabilities. “Commercial paper user” is an indicator variable equal to one if part of the institution‟s liabilities 
were financed  with commercial paper, and zero otherwise. “Deposits” are  measured as total customer deposits 
divided by total liabilities. “Rated” is an indicator variable equal to one if the institution possessed an S&P rating, 
and “rating” is an ordinal measure of the institution‟s rating which takes the value 1 for a rating of AAA, 2 for AA+, 
3 for AA, 4 for AA-, and so forth. “Investment securities”, “Assets held for sale”, and “Trading securities” denote 
the fraction of total assets held in investment securities, held for sale, and held in trading securities, respectively. 
Assets held for sale are omitted from the panels that focus on non-depository institutions since there is only one non-
missing observation among these firms. “Derivatives” denotes the log of the gross notional amount of derivatives 
held divided by total assets. “Non-interest income” is the ratio of non-interest income to the sum of non-interest 
income and net interest income. “Income variability” is the standard deviation of the institution‟s pre-tax return on 
assets over the 20 preceding quarters. “Non-depository” is an indicator variable equal to one if the institution is a 
non-depository institution, and zero otherwise. Institutions are defined as depository if the two-digit SIC code in 
Compustat equals 60 and the institution has deposits, and as non-depository if the two-digit SIC code in Compustat 
equals 61 or 62 and the institution does not have deposits. Tests of differences between the bottom performers and 
the other institutions are performed using t-tests that assume unequal variances across groups as well as Mann-
Whitney U tests. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. 41 
 
Panel A: Comparison of 2006 characteristics of all institutions 
               
  Bottom obs  Bottom 
mean 
Others obs  Others 
mean 
Difference  t-statistic  Mann-Whitney 
z-statistic 
Return in 2006  51  0.1240  296  0.1186  0.0054  0.1552  0.4443 
Book-to-market  51  0.6554  295  0.5897  0.0657  1.9265*  1.9444* 
Log (market value)  51  6.6793  296  5.9765  0.7028  2.0256**  1.7471* 
Beta  51  0.7611  296  0.6909  0.0702  0.9343  0.9990 
Leverage  51  9.8911  295  7.1710  2.7201  3.4533***  4.5627*** 
Asset growth  51  0.1675  296  0.0983  0.0692  4.8842***  5.2384*** 
Short-term funding  51  0.1795  296  0.0845  0.0950  3.9715***  4.7230*** 
Commercial paper user  29  0.3103  213  0.0986  0.2118  2.3582**  3.2397*** 
Deposits  51  0.6451  294  0.7910  -0.1460  -3.6453***  -4.0243*** 
Rated  51  0.3137  296  0.1824  0.1313  1.8928*  2.1549** 
Rating  16  7.6250  54  7.2037  0.4213  0.4737  0.1201 
Investment securities  51  0.1355  293  0.2002  -0.0647  -3.7072***  -4.4611*** 
Assets held for sale  39  0.0144  280  0.0086  0.0058  1.1914  1.7033* 
Trading securities  49  0.0376  280  0.0063  0.0312  2.1245**  2.6611*** 
Income variability  49  0.0016  287  0.0014  0.0001  0.4808  1.6000 
Non-depository  51  0.1176  296  0.0405  0.0771  1.6409  2.2899** 
 
Panel B: Comparison of 1997 characteristics of all institutions 
               
  Bottom obs  Bottom 
mean 
Others obs  Others 
mean 
Difference  t-statistic  Mann-Whitney 
z-statistic 
Return in 1997  44  0.6593  236  0.6418  0.0175  0.3075  0.3285 
Book-to-market 1997  40  0.5407  232  0.4635  0.0772  2.1000**  2.2069** 
Log (market value) 1997  40  6.2036  233  5.6075  0.5961  1.6448  1.6041 
Beta 1995-1997  34  0.7357  194  0.3835  0.3523  3.0512***  3.1061*** 
Leverage 1997  40  8.8120  232  5.5875  3.2245  3.5834***  4.4159*** 
Asset growth 1997  38  0.2146  209  0.1476  0.0671  2.6570**  3.0582*** 
Short-term funding 1997  41  0.2707  238  0.0900  0.1807  4.3357***  3.9309*** 
Commercial paper user 1997  24  0.4583  192  0.0990  0.3594  3.3866***  4.7886*** 
Deposits 1997  39  0.5861  234  0.8354  -0.2493  -4.4578***  -4.6027*** 
Rated 1997  41  0.3659  239  0.1213  0.2445  3.0934***  3.9675*** 
Rating 1997  15  7.4000  29  6.6552  0.7448  0.7492  0.6249 
Investment securities 1997  34  0.1794  234  0.2387  -0.0593  -3.0094***  -2.5810*** 
Assets held for sale 1997  29  0.0307  221  0.0097  0.0211  1.5121  3.3736*** 
Trading securities 1997  38  0.0536  221  0.0028  0.0507  2.4399**  3.8830*** 
Income variability 1997  10  0.0020  51  0.0017  0.0003  0.4421  0.9546 42 
 
Panel C: Comparison of 2006 characteristics of depository institutions 
               
  Bottom obs  Bottom 
mean 
Others obs  Others 
mean 
Difference  t-statistic  Mann-Whitney 
z-statistic 
Return in 2006  45  0.1112  284  0.1144  -0.0032  -0.0867  0.1990 
Book-to-market  45  0.6779  284  0.5867  0.0912  2.5592**  2.5302** 
Log (market value)  45  6.2694  284  5.9347  0.3347  1.0177  0.8923 
Beta  45  0.7134  284  0.6808  0.0327  0.4056  0.4301 
Leverage  45  9.3665  284  7.1763  2.1901  2.6542**  3.7262*** 
Tier 1 capital ratio  40  9.4580  279  11.0646  -1.6066  -5.1015***  -3.8184*** 
Asset growth  45  0.1667  284  0.0965  0.0702  4.5784***  4.8951*** 
Short-term funding  45  0.1424  284  0.0747  0.0677  3.8519***  4.3672*** 
Commercial paper user  23  0.2174  204  0.1029  0.1145  1.2648  1.6303 
Deposits  45  0.7272  284  0.8189  -0.0917  -3.5872***  -3.4310*** 
Rated  45  0.2444  284  0.1761  0.0684  0.9965  1.0951 
Rating  11  8.8182  50  7.2600  1.5582  1.5005  1.7750* 
Investment securities  45  0.1367  284  0.2037  -0.0671  -4.5776***  -4.2221*** 
Assets held for sale  39  0.0144  279  0.0085  0.0059  1.2216  1.7410* 
Trading securities  43  0.0109  270  0.0022  0.0087  1.4653  1.5222 
Ln(1+Derivatives)  22  0.3752  205  0.1118  0.2634  1.4484  1.2804 
Non-interest income  40  0.1927  284  0.2530  -0.0602  -3.2280***  -3.2614*** 
Income variability  43  0.0016  278  0.0012  0.0004  1.3472  2.0058** 
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Panel D: Comparison of 1997 characteristics of depository institutions 
               
  Bottom obs  Bottom 
mean 
Others obs  Others 
mean 
Difference  t-statistic  Mann-Whitney 
z-statistic 
Return in 1997  38  0.6451  227  0.6504  -0.0053  -0.0827  -0.2630 
Book-to-market 1997  34  0.5442  222  0.4606  0.0836  2.2188**  2.1912** 
Log (market value) 1997  34  5.8066  222  5.5544  0.2522  0.7127  0.7984 
Beta 1995-1997  28  0.5528  188  0.3673  0.1855  1.8479*  1.9642** 
Leverage 1997  34  7.3583  222  5.6245  1.7338  3.1622***  3.2955*** 
Tier 1 capital ratio 1997  29  9.6931  228  11.8026  -2.1095  -3.2279***  -3.1642*** 
Asset growth 1997  32  0.2161  202  0.1473  0.0688  2.5829**  2.8275*** 
Short-term funding 1997  35  0.2024  228  0.0814  0.1210  3.2197***  2.8698*** 
Commercial paper user 1997  19  0.3684  188  0.1011  0.2674  2.3085**  3.3431*** 
Deposits 1997  34  0.6702  229  0.8503  -0.1801  -3.6983***  -3.8466*** 
Rated 1997  35  0.2857  229  0.1135  0.1722  2.1449**  2.7592*** 
Rating 1997  10  8.9000  26  6.4615  2.4385  2.4288**  2.3920** 
Investment securities 1997  32  0.1863  229  0.2427  -0.0564  -2.8272***  -2.3825** 
Assets held for sale 1997  29  0.0307  220  0.0097  0.0210  1.5087  3.3536*** 
Trading securities 1997  33  0.0169  216  0.0019  0.0150  1.3369  2.9472*** 
Ln(1+Derivatives 1997)  14  0.0574  170  0.0398  0.0176  0.3090  -0.4348 
Non-interest income 1997  28  0.1964  187  0.1836  0.0128  0.3883  -0.8469 
Income variability 1997  6  0.0028  45  0.0013  0.0015  1.8078  1.5787 
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Table 9: Probit regressions predicting membership in the bottom performer group 
The table shows marginal effects from probit regressions predicting whether a financial institution‟s stock return is 
in the bottom tercile both in the 1998 crisis and the financial crisis of 2007/2008. Panel A uses firm characteristics in 
2006 to predict membership in the bottom performer group, and panel B uses firm characteristics in 1997. Models 
(1) through (3) include commercial banks, savings institutions, and non-depository institutions. Model (4) excludes 
non-depository  institutions,  and  models  (5)  and  (6)  contain  variables  that  are  available  for  commercial  banks 
regulated by the FDIC only. All variables are defined in the caption of Table 8. Numbers in parentheses are z-
statistics, and ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A: 2006 firm characteristics 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 












             












             












             












             












             












             












             












             












             












             












             












             












             












             












             












             












             












             












Number of observations  346  344  297  297  219  219 
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Panel B: 1997 firm characteristics 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 












             












             












             












             












             












             












             












             












             












             












             












             












             












             












             












             












             












Number of observations  225  221  189  163  83  82 46 
Table 10: Firm characteristics in 2006 and performance during the 1998 crisis 
The table shows results from cross-sectional regressions of various firm characteristics of the sample banks in 2006 on the banks' performance during the crisis of 
1998 and control variables. The dependent variables are: leverage, the Tier 1 capital ratio, distance to default (DTD), short-term funding, and asset growth. 
“Leverage” is defined as book value of assets minus book value of equity plus market value of equity divided by market value of equity, and “Tier 1 capital 
ratio” is obtained from the Compustat Bank database. “Distance to default” is estimated as the natural logarithm of (CAR+ROA)/volatility(ROA), where CAR is 
the capital to assets ratio, ROA is the return on assets, and the volatility of ROA is measured on a quarterly basis from 2003-2006. “Short-term funding” is 
calculated as debt in current liabilities divided by total liabilities, and “asset growth” is the annualized growth rate of total assets from fiscal year end 2003 
through 2006. We report results both for the full sample and for the sample of depository institutions only, except for the Tier 1 capital ratio and the distance to 
default, which are available for depository institutions only. “Crisis return 1998” is the bank's stock return from the first trading date in August 1998 until the day 
in 1998 on which the bank's stock attains its lowest price. “Rebound return 1998” is the stock return over the six months after the date on which the lowest price 
occurs. Control variables are measured at the end of 2005 for the leverage, Tier 1 capital, distance to default, and short-term funding regressions. For the asset 
growth regressions, they are measured at the end of 2003 since asset growth itself is measured during 2004-2006. Control variables include the bank's equity beta 
measured during the previous three years, the stock return in the previous calendar year, the book-to-market ratio, the natural log of the market value of the 
bank's equity, and, for the asset growth regressions only, leverage, and the Tier 1 capital ratio. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics, and ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Dependent variable:  Leverage  Tier 1  DTD  Short-term funding  Asset growth 
Institutions in sample:  All  Depository  Depository  Depository  All  Depository  All  Depository 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
















                 
















                 
















                 
















                 
















                 
















                 
















                 
















                 
















Number of observations  345  328  318  318  345  328  345  287 
R-squared  0.33  0.40  0.15  0.07  0.29  0.22  0.11  0.08 
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Table 11: Robustness tests  
The table shows robustness tests for the cross-sectional regressions of annualized buy-and-hold returns for banks 
from July 2007 to December 2008 on the banks' performance during the crisis of 1998 and firm characteristics. 
Models  (1)  and  (2)  estimate  median  regressions  instead  of  ordinary  least  squares.  Models  (3)  and  (4)  use  an 
alternative definition of 1998 crisis and rebound returns and estimate OLS regressions. For columns 1 and 2, “Crisis 
return 1998” is the bank's stock return from the first trading day in August 1998 until the day in 1998 on which the 
bank's stock attains its lowest price. “Crisis return 1998 (Alternative)” is the bank‟s stock return from August 3, 
1998 to October 1, 1998, and “Rebound return 1998 (Alternative)” uses returns from October 2, 1998 to April 1, 
1999. Control variables include the bank's equity beta measured during 2004 – 2006 and the stock return in calendar 
year 2006. The additional control variables are measured at the end of fiscal year 2006 and include the book-to-
market ratio, the natural log of the market value of the bank's equity, leverage, and the Tier 1 capital ratio. Numbers 
in parentheses are t-statistics, and ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 








         








         










         










         








         








         








         








         








         








         








Number of observations  345  318  345  318 
R-squared      0.15  0.13 
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Table 12: Placebo regressions 
The table shows placebo regressions predicting buy-and-hold returns for banks during various time periods using the 
return during the 1998 crisis and placebo returns during a hypothetical 1997 “crisis”. Models (1) through (4) predict 
stock returns during the recent financial crisis from July 2007 through December 2008. Models (5) and (6) use the 
crisis return in 1998 to predict the return from July 2005 through December 2006. “Crisis return 1998” is the bank's 
stock return from the first trading day in August 1998 until the day in 1998 on which the bank's stock attains its 
lowest price. “Placebo return 1997” measures a hypothetical crisis return as the return from the first trading day in 
August 1997 over the following 50 trading days, i.e. the average number of days over which the 1998 crisis return is 
measured. “Large bank” is an indicator variable equal to one if the bank‟s book value of assets at the end of 2006 
(end of 2004 for model (6)) was above the sample median, and zero otherwise. Firm characteristics are measured at 
the end of the fiscal year preceding the year for which returns are predicted, that is they are measured in 2006 for 
models (1) through (4), and 2004 for models (5) and (6). Firm characteristics include the bank‟s stock return during 
the previous year, the book-to-market ratio, the natural log of the market value of the bank's equity, and leverage. 
The firm‟s beta is measured over the previous three years, i.e. from 2004 through 2006 for models (1) through (4), 
and 2002 through 2004 for models (5) and (6). Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics, and ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 


























             














             












             














             












             












             












             












             












             












             












Number of observations  346  346  303  303  346  346 
R-squared  0.16  0.18  0.17  0.18  0.02  0.04 
 